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The face inhibition effect: Social contrast or
motor competition?
Steven P. Tipper and Patric Bach
Centre for Clinical and Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Wales, Bangor, UK
Merely viewing the faces of famous athletes affects the observers’ motor system, suggesting that action-
based information is a core feature of person representations, even when no specific action is visible
(Bach & Tipper, 2006). Unexpectedly, these person-based motor priming effects were inhibitory. Foot
responses were slower when identifying footballers, and hand responses for tennis players. Here, we
demonstrate that these inhibitory effects are only evoked when action is implicitly associated with the
athletes; when the athletes are seen performing their skilled actions the effect reverses towards
facilitation. The contrast between inhibition evoked by implicit action priming and facilitation evoked by
the explicit presentation of an action supports the notion of inhibitory control in the motor system. We
hypothesise that when no specific action is perceived, a range of actions are activated triggering lateral
inhibition, whereas when a specific action is viewed, there is no competition and excitation facilitates
similar responses.
Keywords: Embodied cognition; Inhibition; Motor priming; Person memory; Social perception.
Research has demonstrated that the motor system
not only subserves the output of goal-directed
behaviour, but is also involved in representing the
actions of others. So-called ‘‘mirror neurons’’
have been discovered in the premotor cortex of
the macaque monkey (di Pellegrino, Fadiga,
Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992). Mirror
neurons fire not only if a monkey performs a
particular action, but also if it sees this action
being performed by a conspecific, suggesting that
others’ actions are coded in the same way as our
own. In humans, mirror-like processes have been
demonstrated by studies showing overlapping
brain activation during both action execution
and observation (e.g., Buccino, Binkofski, Fink,
Fadiga, Fogassi, et al., 2001; Chong, Cunnington,
Williams, Kanwisher, & Mattingley, 2008). More-
over, behavioural studies have repeatedly demon-
strated that observing an action facilitates the
production of similar actions but interferes with
the production of different actions (e.g., Brass,
Bekkering, Wohlschla¨ger, & Prinz, 2000). For
instance, seeing a video of a person kick a football
facilitates foot responses relative to finger re-
sponses, and vice versa for seeing a person typing
on a keyboard (Bach, Peatfield, & Tipper, 2007;
Bach & Tipper, 2007).
It has been proposed that such ‘‘embodied’’
representations of others’ actions could provide
an observer with empathic insights into how the
actions would feel for the other person, allowing
inferences about the internal states driving them
(Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003;
Gallese, 2001; Hayes, Paul, Beuger, & Tipper,
2007; Tipper & Bach, 2008). A crucial question is,
however, whether such processes only help us to
understand actions that are directly observed, or
whether they also allow us to put ourselves in the
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shoes of others, when they are not acting. Such a
role would significantly broaden the ways in
which embodiment processes could guide social
interactions, adding to the action understanding
processes that occur ex post, the possibility of
anticipating other people’s motor behaviours that
are not yet performed (e.g., Liepelt et al., 2009).
Consider the situation of observing the face of
Wayne Rooney (the famous English footballer).
A central aspect to the representation of this
person should be expert motor skills with the feet,
predicting activation of foot-related motor repre-
sentations in the observer. In contrast, when
viewing the face of a famous tennis player such
as Tim Henman, embodiment accounts of person
perception predict activation of this individual’s
expert hand skills. Such person-based motor
priming effects have indeed been demonstrated
(Bach & Tipper, 2006) when viewing the faces of
such famous tennis and footballers, even though
the stimuli did not contain any cues to these
persons’ motor skills. Intriguingly, however, these
motor priming effects were inhibitory: Responses
with the body part (hands or feet) involved in the
viewed athlete’s sport were slower and less
accurate.
Here, we test two accounts of these unexpected
inhibitory priming effects. The first account was
proposed by Bach and Tipper (2006) in an
attempt to explain the face inhibition effects.
Within social psychology it is well established
that priming participants with a trait (e.g., intelli-
gence) via a person with very high values on this
trait (e.g., Albert Einstein) inhibits performance
on related tests (i.e., knowledge tests; Bargh,
Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis et al.,
1998). It is assumed that such contrast effects
occur because participants automatically compare
themselves with the primed individuals. When
they find their abilities to be inferior, perfor-
mance on related tasks is impaired. Since the
athletes in our study possessed very elite motor
skills, beyond the skills attainable by our student
participants, the inhibitory priming effects could
arise from such quick and automatic social
comparisons.
However, in contrast, the inhibitory effects
may reflect a more basic mechanism in the motor
system. For coherent goal-directed behaviour it is
crucial that a specific action is evoked at a specific
point in time, while other less desirable actions
are prevented from being carried out. Models of
the motor system therefore include inhibitory
mechanisms that hold inappropriate responses at
bay. In the model of Houghton and Tipper (1994),
for instance, lateral inhibition acts on simulta-
neously activated motor schemata that lower the
overall response tendencies, until one motor
schema is activated over and above the others.
Such models predict that for a visual stimulus
to facilitate a response, this stimulus needs to
strongly prime one specific motor response,
rather than a whole set of similar responses that
may inhibit one another. Indeed, an increasing
number of studies recently reported negative
motor priming effects when motor responses
were primed in a perceptually weak and/or
unspecific manner (e.g., Schlaghecken & Eimer,
2002; Sumner, Pei-Chun, Yu, & Nachev, 2006).
Therefore, because the face of an athlete can
similarly only weakly prime a whole range of
motor behaviours associated with the athletes’
sport rather than one specific action (i.e., not a
specific kick, but all the highly skilled foot
behaviours associated with football), the inhibi-
tory effects could reflect such automatic inhibi-
tion processes.
To differentiate between the two accounts of
the inhibitory motor priming effects, we used a
task in which participants identified two famous
footballers and tennis players with finger and foot
keypresses. Of each type of athlete (tennis, foot-
ball), one always had to be identified with a finger
keypress and the other with a foot keypress,
creating a situation in which each response
(finger, foot) was either compatible or incompa-
tible with the identified athlete’s sport (tennis,
football). Crucially, in one condition, only the
athletes’ face was visible, with no information as
to their sport being present. This nonaction
condition is compared to a condition where the
athletes are shown performing their highly skilled
motor behaviours (i.e. kicking a football, or
hitting a tennis ball with a racket). This manip-
ulation keeps the perceived motor skills of the
athletes constant, but varies whether the stimuli
weakly/implicitly primed a diffuse range of motor
behaviours associated with the athletes’ sports
(the nonaction face images) or directly/explicitly
primed a very specific motor action out of this
range (the action images).
If the inhibitory effects emerged due to auto-
matic social comparison processes, then we pre-
dict inhibition effects in both conditions, because
the same highly skilled athletes were present*
and had to be identified*in both types of images.
If, however, the effects emerged because the
nonaction face stimuli were too weak and general
























to prime specific actions, the inhibition effects
should turn into facilitation effects when the
athletes are shown performing their sports and
specific motor behaviours are activated strongly
and specifically (i.e., a particular way of kicking
the football). Note that this latter prediction of
facilitation effects for the action images is not
trivial, as such effects are not detected when
seeing nonfamous individuals in static pictures,
even when performing an action on an object,
such as kicking a football (Bach et al., 2007; Bach
& Tipper, 2007). Hence the first detection of such
facilitation effects in these Action conditions
would reflect the retrieval of the skilled motor
representations of the famous athlete.
METHOD
Participants
Forty-eight students (11 males) ranging in age
from 18 to 29 years participated in the study. All
participants were students at Bangor University,
Wales. All had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. They received payment for their participa-
tion (£5) and gave informed consent. The study
was approved by Bangor University’s Ethics
committee and was conducted in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki. Subjects were
only allowed to participate after confirming on a
questionnaire that they knew each athlete either
from reading about him or from watching him
play. Four additional participants that made more
than 20% errors in total were excluded.
Material and apparatus
The experiment was controlled by Presentation
run on a 3.2 GHz PC running Windows XP.
Ninety-six pictures made up the stimulus set.
Equal numbers of these pictures were photo-
graphs of Wayne Rooney, Michael Owen, Greg
Rusedski, and Tim Henman (24 photographs
each). One half of these photographs showed
the athletes during nonsporting activities (nonac-
tion stimuli, Figure 1, lower panels). The other
half showed the athletes on the football field or
the tennis court, performing their typical motor
behaviours with the corresponding goal objects
(i.e., kicking a football, or hitting a tennis ball
with a racket) (action stimuli, Figure 1, upper
panels).
Procedure and design
The participants were seated in a dimly lit room
facing a colour monitor at a distance of 60 cm.
Figure 1. Example key assignment. This participant has to identify the tennis player Greg Rusedski and the footballer Michael
Owen with a hand response, and the tennis player Tim Henman and the footballer Wayne Rooney with a foot response. The upper
row shows example images of the athletes in their typical environment performing their sports (action condition) and the lower row
shows example images of the athletes in everyday situations, not performing their typical motor behaviours (nonaction condition).
























They filled out a sheet that asked them how often
they had seen the athletes play their sport and
how often they had read about them (15 scale,
anchored as ‘‘not at all’’ on the one end and ‘‘very
often’’ on the other). The participants then
received a computer-driven instruction and their
response assignment. For each participant, one
tennis player had to be identified with a finger
key (compatible) and the other tennis player with
a foot key (incompatible). Analogously, one
footballer had to be identified with a foot
response (compatible) and the other with a finger
response (incompatible). This assignment of ath-
letes to response keys was counterbalanced across
participants. Participants performed a short train-
ing phase after which the experiment proper
started. It lasted for about 20 minutes and
consisted of four blocks of 96 trials each. In
each block, all images appeared once in a
randomised order. Thus, in one half of the trials
the athletes had to be identified with a compatible
response (hand response for tennis players, foot
response for footballers), and in the other half
they had to be identified with an incompatible
response.
The course of each trial was as follows: After
the participants initiated the trial by pressing the
space bar with their left hand, the photograph of
the athlete was presented after 500 ms. They
identified the athlete by either pressing the foot
pedal with their right foot or the enter button on
the computer keyboard with their right index
finger. Participants were instructed to give their
judgement in the interval in which this photo-
graph was on the screen (1500 ms.). If their
judgement was correct, the next trial started. If
they made an error or did not react in the given
response interval of 1500 ms, an error-message
was displayed.
After the experiment was finished, a computer-
based questionnaire assessing the participants’
views of the athletes’ level of skill was adminis-
tered, by using the numerical keys on the com-
puter keyboard to enter a value ranging from 4
to4 (anchored with ‘‘not at all’’ on one side and
‘‘very much’’ on the other). For each of the
athletes, the participants assessed how skilled
they judged him to be at his own sport compared
to other professional athletes (e.g., football for
Wayne Rooney, tennis for Tim Henman), how
talented they thought the athlete would be for the
respective other sport (e.g., tennis for Wayne
Rooney, football for Tim Henman), and how
much they generally liked him.
RESULTS
Compatibility effects
For the analysis of RTs (Figure 2, top panel), trials
in which the participants pressed the wrong
button or did not react in the given time interval
were excluded (8%). The remaining RTs were
entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA with
the within-subjects factors compatibility (compa-
tible/incompatible) and context (action/nonac-
tion). There was a main effect of context,
F(1, 47)354.8, pB.001, MSE576.23. The
athletes were identified more quickly when they
were seen at everyday activities than when seen
performing their sports, probably because the to-
be-identified faces were larger/clearer in the
former images. The main effect of compatibility
was not significant (FB1), but there was a highly
significant interaction of context and compatibil-
ity, F(1, 47)21.4, pB.001, MSE555.29. Post
hoc t-tests showed that when the athletes were
shown performing their sport in the action con-
dition, responses were faster (p.016) when the
sporting activity was similar to the identification
response (foot-football, hand-tennis). When,
however, the athletes were presented not per-
forming an action in the nonaction condition, the
data showed that responses similar to the athletes’
skilled effector were impaired (pB.033).
The error rates were analysed with the same
ANOVA model. As in the analysis of RTs, there
was a main effect of context, F(1, 47)90.3,
pB.001, MSE.001, but neither the main effect
of compatibility (FB1), nor the interaction of
compatibility and context, F(1, 47)1.4, p.25,
MSE.001, were significant. Numerically, the
data pattern resembled the RT data (Figure 2,
lower panel).
Correlations with subjective ratings
To ascertain how far the observed effects depend
on the participant’s prior knowledge of and
attitude towards the athletes, we ran separate
regression analyses with the participants’ average
compatibility effects in the action and nonaction
condition for the RTs and error rates as criterion
variables and the participants’ familiarity with
the athletes (from seeing them play and reading
about them) and their ratings of the athletes’ skill
in the athletes’ own sport (e.g., football for
























Wayne Rooney), the respective other sport (e.g.,
tennis for Wayne Rooney), and the participants’
general liking of the athletes, as predictor vari-
ables. Table 1 shows the results of this analysis for
the RTs and error rates, for both the action and
nonaction conditions. In the action condition, the
compatibility effects showed, first, significant
relationships with the participants’ subjective
judgements of the athletes. Motor priming effects
were stronger for those participants who judged
the athletes to be highly skilled at their own sport
(e.g., football for Wayne Rooney), whereas no
relationships were apparent with their perceived
skill in the respective other sport (e.g., tennis for
Wayne Rooney), nor with the participants’ gen-
eral liking of the athletes. In addition, the
compatibility effects in the RTs of the action
conditions were also significantly determined by
how often the participants’ had previously
watched the athletes perform their sport, whereas
the amount they read about them had no effect.
These relationships were only found in the action
condition where the athletes were viewed
performing their skilled actions. In the nonaction
condition, no significant relationships were
observed.
TABLE 1
Results of the regression analysis, showing the standardised beta coefﬁcients describing the relationships between motor priming
effects in both the action and nonaction conditions for RTs and error rates and the respective predictor variables
Action Nonaction
Predictor DRTs DErrors DRTs DErrors
Familiarity: Seen play .33* .13 .00 .09
Familiarity: Read about .25 .01 .05 .28
Skill: Athlete’s sport .41** .43** .21 .00
Skill: Other sport .12 .05 .12 .24
Liking .07 .11 .04 .16
*pB.05, **pB.01.
Figure 2. Mean RTs (upper panel) and mean error rates (lower panel). The error bars show the standard error of the mean.

























Identifying famous athletes automatically acti-
vates the motor system. The resulting motor
priming effects can be either facilitatory or
inhibitory, depending on the situation in which
the athletes are observed. Viewing the athlete’s
face without direct cues to action leads to an
inhibition of responses similar to the athletes’
sport (e.g., foot responses are slowed when
identifying the face of a footballer). However,
when the athletes are seen producing a specific
example of their skilled behaviour (e.g., kicking a
football or hitting a tennis ball with a racket),
clear motor facilitation effects were observed, and
responses similar to the athlete’s sporting activity
were sped up. Furthermore, in the latter action
condition at least, larger facilitation priming
effects were produced by those participants who
had observed the athletes play their sport more
often and who rated the athletes as more highly
skilled.
This pattern of results differentiates between
the two theories proposed to explain the inhibi-
tion effects when identifying the face of an athlete
in the nonaction condition. In terms of the social
contrast account, we had previously assumed that
the inhibitory motor priming effects emerged
because people automatically compare them-
selves with others, and map the outcome of
these comparisons*being less skilled than Wayne
Rooney in using one’s feet, for example*onto
their motor system (Dijksterhuis et al., 1998).
Such views predict, however, that motor inhibi-
tion would also occur when the athletes are
presented while performing their sport. Indeed,
this account might predict that the contrast
between participant and athlete skill level would
be greater when observing a specific example of
the skill, particularly when the participant has had
many previous exposures to the skill via observa-
tion of the athletes, and rates them as highly
skilled. However, the opposite pattern of results
was observed, with the action condition showing
motor facilitation that was stronger when the
participant rated the athletes as more highly
skilled.
Thus, motor priming is better predicted by
current models of the motor system that postulate
that action stimuli have to be salient and specific
to facilitate overt motor behaviour, whereas non-
specific action stimuli, or those that lack salience
due to masking, cause inhibition (e.g., Eimer &
Schlaghecken, 2003; Houghton & Tipper, 1994).
In the model of Houghton and Tipper (1994), for
example, lateral inhibition acts between different,
simultaneously activated motor actions, which
may lower the overall response tendencies for
this group of actions, unless one motor schema is
activated strongly and specifically enough to
establish itself against all the others (see also,
Dagenbach & Carr, 1994). Consistently, recent
studies reporting negative compatibility effects
have all used stimuli that did not show the target
behaviour directly but primed it implicitly, for
instance by using subliminal presentation (Eimer
& Schlaghecken, 2003) or language cues for
actions that involve a set of different motor
behaviours rather than a specific one (e.g., ‘‘sow-
ing the shirt’’; Buccino et al., 2005). Analogously,
we propose that the faces of the athletes activate a
whole class of motor skills associated with the
athlete in a weak and nonspecific manner (i.e., all
motor acts associated with football or tennis), and
therefore give rise to the observed inhibition
effects. If, however, the stimuli provide strong
visual evidence for specific motor behaviours in
the action condition (i.e., a certain way of attack-
ing the ball with the tennis racket), the corre-
sponding responses of the observer can become
facilitated.
Interestingly, these motor priming effects were
greater when the participant has learned about
the athletes’ motor skill via observation, and
rated the athletes’ skill level highly. That the
effects in the action condition are driven by
knowledge about the athletes’ high level of skill
is further supported by contrasts of our new data
with previous research. When, in similar studies,
nonfamiliar individuals are seen or identified in
static images without apparent motion, no motor
priming effects are detected even when motor
acts on specific objects, such as kicking a ball, are
observed, or when passive individuals are pre-
sented next to objects that are typically manipu-
lated by either feet or hands (Bach et al., 2007;
Bach & Tipper, 2007). This indicates that what
contributes to the motor priming effects in
the action condition are neither the observed
motor acts or objects alone, but the specific
visuomotor memories derived from observing
the athletes perform highly skilled motor beha-
viours, as reflected in the correlation with prior
viewing of the athletes skilled behaviour (as
opposed to reading about them). We therefore
suggest that only when the individual identified
has known high skill levels in the motor domain,
























can facilitation be detected for actions displayed
in static images. In contrast, when the observed
behaviour does not closely match the participant’s
prior experiences with the athletes in the nonaction
condition, these relationships are not observed,
and similar motor performance is inhibited.
CONCLUSIONS
Our new data anchor the embodiment of action in
models of the motor system which contain a
number of properties. First, behaviour is shaped
by both excitation and inhibition processes. The
subtle interactions between these two types of
feedback systems determine the level of activa-
tion internal representations achieve, resulting in
a range of effects from facilitatory to inhibitory
priming, just as described here and in other
studies of motor priming. Second, the action
priming effects not only reflect basic visuomotor
processes transforming observed actions into
one’s own action tendencies. On the contrary,
deeper levels of semantic prior knowledge about
a famous athletes’ skill, and visuomotor memories
of their actions, influence motor states.
Original manuscript received September 2009
Revised manuscript received November 2009
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